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Introduction 
In September 2000, the United Nations (henceforth UN) presented the Millennium 
Declaration, a milestone in international cooperation inspiring development efforts in 
order to improve the living conditions of millions of people around the world. The 
Millennium Declaration committed the world nations to a new global partnership to 
reduce extreme poverty and setting out a series of time-bound targets – with a deadline 
of 2015 – by which progress in reducing income poverty, hunger, disease, lack of 
adequate shelter and exclusion – while promoting gender equality, health, education and 
environmental sustainability – can be measured. These time-bound targets have become 
known as the Millennium Development Goals (henceforth MDGs). The MDGs project 
is one of the major efforts undertaken by the international community to raise global 
living standards and fulfill the promise for a better world.  
The extent to which world countries have achieved the different MDGs is a matter of 
great interest for academics and policy-makers alike that depends on a long array of 
explanatory factors. Among these we are particularly interested in two of the most 
prominent ones: population and economic growth. It is hard to find any two other social 
phenomena that have attracted more attention in the last decades than the so-called 
‘population explosion’ and the unprecedented boost in economic growth experienced in 
many areas of the world that some have denoted as the ‘income explosion’ (see 
Firebaugh 2003 or Easterlin 2000). On the one hand, the study of the impact of 
population growth on countries’ well-being and living standards has been a matter of 
contentious debate for a long time and has reasons to continue for many years to come 
(see Ahlburg et al 1996). The views in this debate have ranged from alarmism – 
population growth has been depicted as a trigger of mass starvation, resource depletion, 
pollution and increased poverty (see Ehrlich 1968) – to optimism – economies of scale, 
technological innovation, globalization and behavioral adaptation are some of the 
channels through which the negative effects of population growth might be offset (see, 
for instance, Boserup 1981, Simon 1981, Lam 2011). While not being so central stage 
as it used to be back in the 60s and 70s[[[Endnote#1]]], population growth continues to 
pose enormous challenges for developing countries (e.g. ensure poverty reduction, 
universal education, better health systems, increasing gender equality or greater access 
to water and sanitation simultaneously might be a daunting task in face of growing 
populations), so it is still a fundamental ingredient to understand countries’ performance 
in their attempt to reach the MDGs targets. On the other hand, the study of the impact of 
economic growth on countries’ well-being has been much less investigated. Since it is 
usually taken for granted that economic growth naturally goes hand-in-hand with 
improvements in societies’ living conditions, the matter has received scant attention 
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from the specialized literature. Yet, a few recent studies have challenged such 
entrenched assumptions finding a small to null association between economic growth 
and (i) child undernutrition (Harttgen et al 2013, Vollmer et al 2014) and (ii) other 
quality of life indicators (Easterly 1999). All in all, these ideas call for a fresh and 
comprehensive analysis studying the effects of population and economic growth on 
countries’ performance in the different dimensions of the MDG framework. 
Taking advantage of the increasing availability of internationally comparable datasets, 
in this paper we investigate (i) the joint evolution of countries towards MDGs 
achievement, and (ii) the joint impact of population and economic growth on the 
improvement of key social variables belonging to the MDGs – an issue that, to the best 
of our knowledge, has not been empirically investigated so far and which has clear 
implications for the elaboration of policies aiming to fulfill the post-MDGs global 
development agenda that has recently been settled. Have the world countries achieved 
the MDGs simultaneously? Has the rise in the number of people been an obstacle to 
reduce poverty while improving global health, expanding education and promoting 
environmental sustainability? Or have the historically unprecedented increases in GDP 
per capita improved the overall quality of life around the globe? Which of these two 
forces has been more decisive in driving the success or failure of countries towards 
MDGs achievement? These are the main questions this papers aims to address. Having 
recently attained the MDG target date of 2015, it is a good moment to take stock with 
the most recently available data and reflect upon the factors that have contributed to 
countries’ improvements towards the MDGs around the globe.  
After this short introduction we turn to the data and methods section where we present 
the data sources, indicators and statistical techniques used in our analysis. We then 
present our descriptive findings, where we basically describe the evolution of the 
different MDG indicators across regions and countries. In addition, we investigate the 
extent to which the improvements in the different MDG indicators are related to one 
another. Finally, we introduce the results of our models investigating the impact of 
population and economic dynamics on countries’ MDGs achievement both globally and 
regionally. We close with some reflections on possible explanations of our empirical 
findings. 
Data and Methods 
Monitoring the evolution during the last decades of around 200 countries towards the 
achievement of several MDGs is not an easy task. Given the large number of potential 
indicators to be included in the MDGs framework, one has to deal with several partially 
incomplete sources of data that typically do not have the same geographical and 
temporal coverage, a circumstance that usually forces the analyst to make difficult 
decisions involving trade-offs whose consequences are hard to quantify. Within each of 
the MDGs there are different targets and each target is monitored using several 
indicators. According to the UN Statistical office there are 8 goals, 21 targets and 60 
indicators (see http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals). However, when it comes to 
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incorporate these goals, targets and indicators into an international comparative analysis 
like the one performed here a number of difficulties arise. First, despite the increasing 
availability of internationally comparable datasets there are some variables for which 
data simply does not exist. Second, many of the targets are not clearly specified and/or 
are hard to quantify (or non-quantifiable at all). Third, some targets and indicators are 
not defined at the country level, so they cannot be incorporated in a country-basis 
analysis like the one we are carrying out in this paper. Finally, some targets and 
indicators are simply not defined for all countries of the world, so their inclusion would 
seriously compromise the comparative approach of our analysis. The final choice of 
targets and indicators to be included in our measures has been constrained by the 
aforementioned limitations and by the existing trade-offs between geographical 
coverage and inclusion of further indicators. As a result, we have decided to work with 
the following list of indicators (and the corresponding official targets proposed by the 
UN): 
I1: Percentage of population below $1.25 (PPP) per day (MDG#1, Target: Halve 
between 1990 and 2015 the proportion of people below the poverty line). 
I2: Net enrolment ratio in primary education (MDG#2, Target: Ensure that, by 2015, 
children everywhere will be able to complete a full course of primary education). 
I3: Ratios of girls to boys in primary education (MDG#3, Target: Eliminate gender 
disparity in primary education). 
I4: Under-five mortality rate (MDG#4, Target: Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 
and 2015, the under-five mortality rate). 
I5: Maternal mortality ratio (MDG#5, Target: Reduce by three quarters, between 
1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio). 
I6: Death rates associated with tuberculosis (MDG#6, Target: Have halted by 2015 
and begun to reverse the incidence of tuberculosis and other major diseases). 
I7: Percentage of population using an improved drinking water source (MDG#7, 
Target: Halve by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe 
drinking water). 
I8: Percentage of population using an improved sanitation facility (MDG#7, Target: 
Halve by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to basic 
sanitation). 
Overall, this group of indicators offers a reasonably faithful portrait of countries’ 
evolution towards the achievement of the MDGs. While the geographical and temporal 
coverage varies by indicator, we have been able to collect comparable information for 
around 150-200 countries during the last 25 years (at least). In the section of descriptive 
results world countries have been grouped in the following regions: Oceania (OC), 
North Africa (NA), East Asia (EA), South Asia (SA), South East Asia (SEA), West 
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Asia (WA), Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA), Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC), Developed Countries (DC) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) – in appendix 1 we 
show what countries are included in each region. For our regression analysis section, the 
partition is somewhat cruder (only four large regions are considered) to simplify the 
presentation of our findings. The statistical data used in this paper has been accessed 
through the internet from the following sources and institutions: the World Bank, the 
Penn World Tables, the World Health Organization, UNESCO, UNICEF and the Center 
for Systemic Peace. 
Estimation approach 
In order to estimate the effect of population and economic growth on MDGs 
achievement we use multivariate statistical techniques. Because of the way in which it 
has been constructed, our dataset is an unbalanced panel (i.e. the same country is 
followed across several years but some observations might be missing). The panel 
nature of the data allows controlling for any unobserved heterogeneity across countries 
in the form of time-invariant characteristics that affect either the MDG-indicator being 
studied, its measured determinants, or both (examples of these factors can be cultural 
norms, climate, geography or the presence of continuous government development 
programs). To do so we estimate a country and time fixed-effects (FE) model 
[[[Endnote#6]]] which relies on the “within” variation (i.e. changes over time for each 
country and changes across countries for a fixed moment in time respectively) as 
follows: 
𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 .
𝐾
𝑘=1   [1] 
In equation [1] 𝛼 is a scalar, the 𝛽s are the regression coefficients we want to estimate 
corresponding to the independent variables 𝑋𝑘, 𝜇𝑖 are the unobservable country-specific 
time-invariant effects, 𝜆𝑡 are the time-effects and, lastly, 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is the stochastic error term. 
The dependent variable (I) is one of the eight MDG indicators considered in this paper, 
so equation [1] is estimated for each of them separately. The key explanatory variables 
𝑋𝑘 considered in this paper are (logged) population size (‘logpop’) and yearly 
population growth (‘popgr1’) together with economic size (logged GDP per capita: 
‘loggdp’) and yearly economic growth (‘gdpgr1’). Since the notion of ‘growth’ can be 
defined for different time frames (e.g. on an annual, quinquennial or decennial basis) 
and it is not a priori clear which one should be used, we have experimented not only 
with short term (i.e. 1-year) effects, but also with medium (5-years) and longer term 
(10-years) ones; the corresponding labels of the variables are ‘popgr1’, ‘popgr5’, 
‘popgr10’ and ‘gdpgr1’, ‘gdpgr5’, ‘gdpgr10’.  
Several studies investigating the impacts of population growth on economic growth 
have highlighted the importance of considering not only the overall size of a given 
population but also its structure (see, among many others, Bloom et al 2000, Bloom and 
Williamson 1998 or Kelley and Schmidt 1995, 2005). Population as a whole is a broad 
entity that can be partitioned in several groups – some being much more relevant than 
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others for the behavior of certain indicators – whose relative sizes might also have 
important consequences for the problem at hand. Failing to incorporate such more 
finely-grained population structure variables might muddy the waters when attempting 
to assess the impact of demography on countries’ performance in MDGs achievement, 
an issue we investigate in this paper. For this purpose, we have enriched our models 
introducing other demographic variables that might be more highly related to our 
dependent variable (the different Ij) besides mere population size and 
growth[[[Endnote#8]]]. As a result, for each MDG indicator we have generated two 
kinds of implementations of the FE models shown in [1]: one that uses overall 
population size and growth and another that uses indicator-specific demographic related 
variables. As will be shown in the empirical section, the latter tend to generate sharper 
and more conclusive findings than the former. 
What other variables might have a direct bearing on the different MDG indicators 
besides the core economic and demographic variables we have just discussed? Other 
control variables introduced in our models which have been commonly used in 
conceptually related studies analyzing the impacts of population or economic growth on 
living standards (see, for instance, Bloom et al 2000, Kelley and Schmidt 2001, 2005, 
Easterly 1999, Ahlburg et al 1996, Birdsall et al 2001) are the following: 
Population density (‘pden’): In several studies it has been hypothesized that the 
population per unit of land can exert an important influence on several quality-of-life 
indicators (e.g. Bloom et al 2000, Kelley and Schmidt 1995, 2001). On the positive side, 
higher densities can decrease per unit costs and increase transportation efficiency, 
irrigation, markets and communications. On the negative side, higher density might be 
associated with diminishing returns to land or several deleterious effects of over-
concentration, so the predicted impact of population density is ambiguous and highly 
dependent on the MDG indicator we are dealing with. 
Degree of urbanization (‘urb’): Urbanization is a widespread phenomenon that is 
sweeping the world: for the first time in history, in 2000 more than half of the world 
population lived in urban areas. Cities, if well planned, can reap the efficiencies of 
economies of scale as governments can more easily deliver essential infrastructure and 
services at lower cost per capita than in rural areas. Cities have the potential to improve 
people’s access to education, health, housing and other services, and to expand their 
opportunities for economic productivity. If badly planned, cities can host millions of 
slum dwellers without access to the most basic needs. Therefore, the impact of 
urbanization on MDGs achievement is, a priori, unclear. 
Contraceptive prevalence rate (‘cpr’): It is nowadays widely accepted that the 
accessibility to family planning services can be a quite cost-effective method to reduce 
poverty, foster gender equality while improving maternal and child mortality (see 
Ahlburg et al 1996). Quite recently, Cates et al (2010) have convincingly argued that 
ensuring a better access to reproductive health for all can be beneficial for the 
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improvement in every MDG indicator. In this respect, we expect the contraceptive 
prevalence rate to have a positive impact on all our dependent variables. 
Level of democracy (‘demo’): Many studies suggest the importance of democracy for 
improving countries’ well-being indicators like economic performance, life expectancy, 
infant mortality or other physical quality of life indicators (Barro 1991, Wickrama and 
Mulford 1996, London and Williams 1990, Kelley and Schmidt 2001). According to 
these and other studies, the impact of democracy is expected to be positive for all MDG 
indicators. In this paper, democracy is measured using an ordinal variable taking values 
between –10 and 10 obtained from the Polity IV database.  
Capital formation (‘capf’): Capital formation considers additions to the fixed assets of 
the economy, including land improvements, plant machinery, equipment purchases, as 
well as construction of railways, roads, schools, hospitals and commercial and industrial 
buildings. A priori, we expect such domestic investment measure to be positively 
associated with improvements in all MDG indicators. 
Other econometric issues 
 (i) Any study aiming at investigating the impact of population and/or economic growth 
on several quality of life indicators must address the problem of reverse causation. 
There are well identified mechanisms through which changes in the different MDG 
indicators can have an impact on population and/or economic growth. Therefore, to 
more directly ensure that a causal effect is being identified, and that only the causal 
portion of the observed relationship is represented by the regression coefficient 
estimates, we conduct endogeneity tests for those determinants where we suspect that 
bi-directional causality might be at work. Then, we take this endogeneity into account 
by estimating the above equations using instrumental variables (IV). Doing so is 
important for detecting and correcting reverse causality, incidental association and 
attenuation bias due to measurement error. To correct for these potential problems we 
instrument with classical variables from the empirical growth literature – appropriately 
lagged population and economic size and growth, inflation and financial depth.  
(ii) What are the overall quantitative impacts of the various components of demographic 
and economic change on the pace of MDG indicators improvements? Besides the 
regression coefficients 𝛽𝑘 from equation [1], in this paper we are also interested in 
assessing by how much the explanatory variables 𝑋𝑘 have contributed to the 
corresponding MDG-indicator change that has been observed during the last decades. 
To do that, one must account both for the coefficient size and the magnitude of the 
relevant changes in the 𝑋𝑘s. Formally, these contributions are calculated as follows 
𝛽?̂?Δ𝑋𝑘̅̅ ̅ = 𝛽?̂?(𝑋𝑘𝑡2
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑋𝑘𝑡1
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ),  [2] 
where 𝑋𝑘𝑡𝑖
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ is the average value of 𝑋𝑘 across countries in time 𝑡𝑖. In the empirical 
section of the paper we will assess the “importance” of demographic and economic 
change by reporting the values of these expressions for the corresponding 𝛽𝑘 and 𝑋𝑘.  
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Descriptive results 
Are countries achieving the MDGs? 
In this section we briefly describe the evolution of the MDG indicators (from I1 up to I8) 
during the period of analysis (1990-2015). For that purpose, Figure 1 compares the 
values of the MDG indicators in 1990 and the most recently available date (typically 
around 2013) using scatterplots. In these scatterplots we have added several reference 
lines to indicate whether (i) the MDG indicators have improved or deteriorated over 
time, (ii) the corresponding targets have been achieved or not. 
Generally speaking, we observe that most countries have improved the values of the 
different indicators over time (most observations lie on the ‘right’ side of the equality 
line – the main diagonal in the graphs). In this regard, there are two noteworthy 
exceptions. 1) The incidence of tuberculosis (I6) has increased in 25% of the countries. 
2) On many occasions, deteriorations over time are observed for those countries whose 
achievement levels in 1990 were already quite high and there was a very small room for 
further improvement. Instances of the latter have been quite common in the following 
domains: education (I2), gender equality (I3) and water and sanitation access (I7 and I8).  
Despite the generally favorable picture shown in the scatterplots of Figure 1, it turns out 
that many of the improvements that took place between 1990 and 2014 were not large 
enough to reach the corresponding target. As shown in the different scatterplots of 
Figure 1, a large amount of countries fall between the two reference lines (indicating 
improvements over time but failure to reach the MDG target). For the different MDG 
indicators from I1 to I8 except for I6 (in that case the target is not specified anywhere so 
there is no reference line except the one for equality), the percentages of countries 
falling in such intermediate category are 30%, 37%, 24%, 72%, 80%, 28.5% and 48.5% 
respectively. The high levels observed in child and maternal mortality (I4 and I5) are 
noteworthy – suggesting either a global failure in the delivery of health services or an 
overly demanding criterion when designing the corresponding target. Lastly, the 
percentages of countries that have achieved the corresponding targets in the different 
MDG indicators (from I1 to I8) are 37%, 37%, 63%, 27%, 10%, 75%, 55% and 36% 
respectively. Therefore, countries have not been particularly successful in meeting the 
MDGs overall (the high success rate for I6 – 75% – can be attributed to the fact that any 
improvement between 1990 and 2013 was labeled as a ‘success’). 
[[[Figure_1_around_here]]] 
Given the large heterogeneity that can be observed across countries (see Figure 1), it is 
convenient to aggregate results at the regional level to explore if some broad patterns 
can be discerned. In Table 1 we report the average values of each indicator at the 
regional level both in 1990 and in the latest available year. In addition, we show the 
target that each region should attain to consider that the corresponding goal has been 
achieved. To facilitate its interpretation, the cells of Table 1 have been colored 
depending on whether the corresponding goal has been achieved or not: the cells in 
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green correspond to those regions and indicators where the goal has been achieved, 
those in orange denote those cases where the improvements that have occurred over 
time have not been enough to reach the target, while red cells correspond to those cases 
where the corresponding indicator has deteriorated over time. 
As shown in Table 1, neither the world as a whole nor its different regions have been 
particularly successful overall in achieving the MDGs (except, perhaps, for the case of 
East Asia). The only variables where the targets have been achieved for the world at 
large are the ‘poverty’ and ‘tuberculosis’ ones (I1 and I6). On the one hand, the 
reduction in world poverty levels from 35% to 16% has been truly remarkable and is 
largely attributable to the success of India and, specially, China. However, five world 
regions have not been able to attain the poverty reduction goal (Oceania, North Africa, 
West Asia, the Developed Countries and Sub-Saharan Africa). On the other hand, even 
if the improvements in death rates associated with tuberculosis have not been 
particularly large, they have been enough to reach a quite undemanding target 
(unsurprisingly, the target associated to I6 has been attained by all regions except for 
Oceania). Except for the case of maternal mortality (I5) – where the improvements that 
have been observed across the board have not been enough to reach the target (the 
world as a whole has halved the 1990 level of maternal mortality, but it has not been 
able to reduce it by three quarters) – the regional attainments in the other variables have 
been quite heterogeneous. To illustrate: among the 10 regions partitioning the world, the 
targets corresponding to gender equality and child mortality (I3 and I4) have only been 
achieved in three of them and the targets of the two environmental sustainability indices 
corresponding to MDG#7 (I7 and I8) have been achieved in 5 and 4 regions respectively. 
Lastly, the target of achieving universal primary education enrolment has been achieved 
in none of the 10 regions – a discouraging result that is largely explained by the fact that 
regional results average the experience of many countries, so the target is only achieved 
when there is no variation and all those countries within the region achieve universal 
education (a particularly demanding scenario). 
[[[Table 1 around here]]] 
Have the MDGs been attained simultaneously? 
When in year 2000 the world countries signed the Millennium Declaration, they 
implicitly committed to attain all MDG targets simultaneously. Yet, official UN reports 
and academic studies published so far investigate the evolution of the different MDG 
indicators separately but fail to take into consideration their joint evolution over time 
(see, for instance, UN 2014, Sahn and Stifel 2003, Easterly 2009). This way, we do not 
know whether improvements in, say, enrolment in primary education have been 
accompanied by improvements in children’s health – although one typically assumes 
that they have. In other words, no attempt has been made to investigate the relationship 
between improvements in the different MDGs – an issue with implications for our 
understanding of societies’ pathways to development. In order to explore this important 
topic in more detail, Figure 1 plots the joint country level changes between 1990 and the 
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most recent available data for all possible couples of indicators among the ones 
considered in this paper. The scatterplots included in the Matrix of Figure 2 show how 
changes in one indicator ‘i’(Δ𝐼𝑖 = log(𝐼𝑖2/𝐼𝑖1)) are related to changes in another 
indicator ‘j’(Δ𝐼𝑗 = log(𝐼𝑗2/𝐼𝑗1)) for all possible pairs of MDG-indicators. 
Interestingly, there is a remarkable lack of association between changes in alternative 
pairs of MDG-indicators. As suggested by the different scatterplots shown in Figure 2, 
large improvements in a given MDG indicator are not necessarily accompanied by large 
improvements in the other ones. Instead, pair-wise improvements and deteriorations 
seem to go hand in hand in an apparently random fashion. This is not particularly 
encouraging for international development agencies or national governments, as it 
seems that, at the moment, advances in one front are not necessarily accompanied by 
advances in other fronts as well (as opposed to what would happen if strong 
associations were observed between indicators).  
[[[Figure_2_around_here]]] 
Population and economic growth during the last decades 
The key explanatory variables we are focusing on in this paper are demographic and 
economic growth. In Table 2 we show the regional evolution of population size and 
GDP per capita in PPP along the MDGs time frame (1990–2015). As can be seen, both 
population and economic size have increased dramatically since 1990 in all regions and 
in the world as a whole[[[Endnote#10]]]. While to world contained around 5200 million 
inhabitants in 1990, twenty years later such quantity increased to more than 6800 
million. During the same period, and despite the large increase in overall population 
size, the world GDP per capita has more than doubled, from slightly above $5000 in 
1990 to more than $11000 in 2010.  
Notwithstanding these encouraging global trends, Table 2 also shows that the evolution 
has been quite uneven across world regions. On the one hand, all regions have increased 
their populations during the last 25 years, but some have done it at a faster pace than 
others: while Sub-Saharan Africa has increased its population by 70% since 1990, the 
group of Developed Countries has only increased by 8%. On the other hand, the 
regional GDP per capita the distribution is quite uneven as well – with the group of 
Developed Countries well ahead of the other regions. Given the disparities observed in 
both distributions it is a priori unclear whether the impressive record in global economic 
growth will have the same potentially beneficial impact across the different world 
regions – an issue we investigate in the following section. 
 [[[Table_2_around_here]]] 
Estimation results 
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Before estimating the FE models shown in equation [1] it is interesting to visually 
inspect the relationship between population and economic growth and the different 
MDG-indicators changes Δ𝐼𝑖 that have occurred between 1990 and circa 2014. The last 
two rows and columns in Figure 2 show the corresponding scatterplots. Once again, the 
lack of clear associations seems to be the dominant result. More often than not, for a 
given level of population or economic growth we typically observe countries 
experiencing either large or small MDG-indicator improvements (or even 
deteriorations) indistinctly. The lack of correlation between population growth and other 
quality of life indicators is by now a well-established fact in the literature (see Birdsall 
et al 2001). On the other hand, the lack of apparent association between economic 
growth and changes in other MDG-indicators is in line with the findings of Easterly 
(1999) for the period 1960-1990 preceding the time frame of our analysis. 
As is well known, plain associations and the corresponding correlation coefficients are 
problematic because their interpretation is hampered by many technical problems (e.g. 
unobserved heterogeneity or reverse causality). To reduce the impact that these factors 
might have in our estimates we have implemented the FE models referred to in the 
methodological section, which take advantage of the panel structure of our dataset. 
The impact of population and economic growth 
When it comes to estimate the FE models shown in equation [1] there are different a 
priori plausible alternatives. More specifically, there are three important decisions that 
must be made as regards: (i) the period of time for which we are going to define 
population and economic growth (here we have considered 3 alternatives: one, five and 
ten year intervals); (ii) the decision to instrument or not to instrument our regressions (2 
alternatives), and (iii) the choice between overall population or indicator-specific 
demographic variables (2 alternatives). Given the uncertainty and arbitrariness involved 
in such choices, rather than privileging a unique model specification we have preferred 
to make room for different specifications in the aforementioned areas – therefore 
resulting in 3·2·2=12 model specifications per MDG indicator[[[Endnote#12]]]. Given 
the large number of results generated by such approach, we have summarized the main 
findings in Table 3 (the beta coefficients corresponding to each indicator and model 
specification are shown in appendix 2). For each cell in Table 3, a ‘+’ (resp. ‘–’) sign 
appears when all statistically significant betas corresponding to the different models 
have a positive (resp. negative) sign. When the different betas have positive and 
negative signs for alternative model specifications, then we display a ‘?’ sign. In 
addition, we have colored the cells with ‘+’ and ‘–’ signs in green or in red depending 
on whether or not the sign of the estimated betas goes in the normatively desirable 
direction (which in turn depends on the scale of the underlying indicator, see row 1). To 
illustrate: in column 1 (corresponding to the results for I1), the negative betas associated 
to ‘loggdp’ are colored in green because higher economic level is associated with lower 
poverty levels (an indicator measured in a negative scale), whereas the positive betas 
associated to ‘gdpgr1’ and ‘gdpgr10’ are colored in red because higher economic 
growth is associated with higher poverty rates (an undesirable outcome). Lastly, the two 
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columns dedicated to each of the first five MDG indicators (labeled as ‘core’ and ‘spc.’) 
refer to the model results associated to overall population or indicator-specific 
demographic variables respectively (see the Methods section). 
The results summarized in Table 3 are complex and difficult to interpret. The diversity 
of regions and circumstances being compared makes it difficult to discern clear-cut 
patterns that are universally valid across all MDG-indicators considered in this paper. 
Nevertheless, a few broad findings seem to hold true in the majority of cases. Let’s start 
with the core demographic and economic variables. Population size typically has 
significant positive impacts on all MDG-indicators except for the cases of ‘tuberculosis’ 
(I6) and ‘sanitation’ (I8), where the impact is non-significant or inconclusive (i.e. 
positive in some model specifications and negative in others). Other factors kept 
constant, larger countries have typically been more successful than smaller ones in 
terms of MDGs achievements. However, the effect of overall population growth is 
unclear on all MDG-indicators considered in this paper: the coefficients switch signs 
across different model specifications and quite often they are not significant (see the 
columns labeled as ‘core’ – referring to the models having overall population as the 
main demographic explanatory variable). The lack of strongly conclusive results 
regarding overall population growth effects is in line with previous findings attempting 
to estimate the impact of demographic change on economic growth and other well-being 
dimensions (e.g. Ahlburg et al. 1996, Birdsall et al. 2001). The fact that population 
growth can occur through a great variety of channels (e.g. increasing fertility, declining 
mortality, increasing migration) and affect different sectors of the population (e.g. the 
young, the adults, the working age-population or the elderly) varying from place to 
place and over time probably explains the impossibility of making blanket statements 
about overall effects. This is the reason why in some model specifications we have 
changed overall population by an indicator-specific demographic variable that might be 
more relevant for the problem at hand (the corresponding results are shown in the 
columns labeled as ‘spc.’). As can be seen, it is often the case that the use of indicator-
specific demographic variables results in sharper and more conclusive findings than the 
ones obtained when using overall population growth (this is the case for poverty (I1) 
[[[Endnote#13]]], gender equality in education (I3), maternal mortality (I5) and, to a 
lesser extent, education (I2) and infant mortality (I4) – see Table 3). 
As regards economic size, Table 3 shows that it has a ‘positive’ (i.e. normatively 
desirable) relationship with poverty (I1), maternal mortality (I5) tuberculosis (I6) and 
sanitation (I8), and an unclear relationship (mostly – yet not exclusively – consisting of 
‘positive’ relationships) with education (I2), gender equality in education (I3), infant 
mortality (I4) and water access (I7). On the other hand, the relationship between 
economic growth and the MDG-indicators is quite irregular, depending very much on 
whether we are referring to short- , medium- or longer-term growth and on the choice of 
overall population or indicator-specific demographic variables (‘core’ and ‘spc.’ 
columns in Table 3). Despite such irregularity, it is noticeable that one finds so many 
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instances where the relationship is normatively undesirable (red cells in Table 3) and so 
few of them being desirable (the ones marked in green). 
The effect of the other control variables introduced in our models is quite heterogeneous 
as well. The effects of population density and those of the level of democracy can be 
positive, negative or unclear depending on the MDG-indicator we are dealing with, but 
the size of the coefficients tends to be quite small (see appendix 2). While the effect of 
population density on the MDG-indicators was a priori unclear, we were expecting a 
positive relationship between the democracy indicator and all our dependent variables. 
The level of urbanization has positive effects for child and maternal mortality and the 
access to water and sanitation, but it has a non-conclusive effect on the other variables. 
Interestingly, it turns out that the level of capital formation and the contraceptive 
prevalence rate have clear positive and significant effects on virtually all our MDG-
indicators (as a priori expected in our model specification). This suggests that 
investments in countries’ fixed assets (such as hospitals, schools, roads, railways and 
the like) and in family planning programs can have synergistic and cumulative effects 
on the simultaneous improvement of most MDG-indicators considered in this study. 
[[[Table_3_around_here]]] 
A common approach for assessing impacts within regression models is to apply 
estimated coefficients (the 𝛽?̂?) to changes over time of the corresponding variable 
period means (i.e: Δ𝑋𝑘̅̅ ̅). The product 𝛽?̂?Δ𝑋𝑘̅̅ ̅ can be interpreted as the change in the 
corresponding MDG indicator (Ij) that can be attributed to the change in the explanatory 
variable Xk. To simplify, we will refer to 𝛽?̂?Δ𝑋𝑘̅̅ ̅ as ‘the impact’ of Xk on Ij. Since in this 
paper we have considered several model specifications per MDG-indicator (see 
appendix 2) and each of them generates the corresponding set of estimated betas, for 
each explanatory variable Xk and every Ij there is no single but multiple impacts to be 
reported. To simplify the presentation, in Table 4 we only show the maximal and 
minimal impacts coming from statistically significant betas that each explanatory 
variable Xk has on the different MDG-indicators (this is enough to have an approximate 
idea of the influence that the former have on the later). In addition, in appendix 3 we 
also present the global and regional evolution of the different explanatory variables Xk 
over time. As can be seen in Table 4, the impact of overall population size typically 
goes in the normatively desirable direction for virtually all MDG-indicators (i.e: it 
‘reduces’ poverty, maternal and child mortality and tuberculosis while it ‘increases’ 
education, gender equality and water access, see row #3). On the other hand, the impact 
of overall population growth is typically unclear in direction (ranging from negative to 
positive) and not very large in relative terms when compared to the impacts of other 
explanatory variables (see row #4). Interestingly, when overall population is substituted 
by indicator-specific demographic variables, their impacts are clearer in direction (both 
maximum and minimum having the same signs) and larger in magnitude (see rows #8–
#11). Observe that even if the relationship between Xk and the Ij (i.e: the betas) might go 
in the normatively undesirable direction, the corresponding impact might go in the 
‘right direction’. This is, for instance, the case of fertility: while it is related to increased 
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poverty and worse children and maternal health, its reduction over time has had a 
positive impact on the evolution of these variables. 
As regards the impact of economic size, we can see it has contributed to reduce poverty, 
maternal mortality, tuberculosis and water access while increasing access to sanitation 
(see row #1 for core variable models and #5 for indicator-specific ones). According to 
the indicator-specific results shown in row #5, economic size has also contributed to the 
expansion of education. Examining rows #2 and #6, we can see that economic growth 
has contributed to reduce poverty and maternal mortality but also water and sanitation 
access. It is important to highlight that the channel through which economic growth has 
contributed to reduce poverty is the opposite of what one might a priori expect. It is 
because (i) higher economic growth is associated with higher poverty levels (positive 
betas, see Table 3 and appendix 2) and (ii) average economic growth has decreased over 
time between 1980 and 2010 (Δ𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑔𝑟̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ < 0, see appendix 3) that the impact of the later 
has been beneficial to reduce poverty rates. For the other MDG-indicators, the impact of 
economic growth has been unclear (with positive and negative impacts depending on 
the model specification). When comparing the magnitude of economic size and 
economic growth impacts, it is noticeable that the former are typically much larger than 
the former, i.e. the impact of economic growth has been much less important than the 
impact of economic size. 
Lastly, the impact of the remaining control variables has been quite heterogeneous as 
well. Population density has contributed to improvements in poverty, education and 
gender equality but deteriorations in children and maternal health and water and 
sanitation access. We have been surprised by the latter because a priori we would have 
expected that, other factors kept constant, water supply was facilitated by higher 
population densities. On the other hand, urbanization has contributed to reduce poverty, 
maternal and child mortality while increasing water and sanitation access. As regards 
the level of democracy it has benefited children and maternal health and water access 
but, surprisingly, it has deteriorated education expansion, gender equality, the incidence 
of tuberculosis and sanitation access. Yet, the impact of the democracy variable has 
been quite small in magnitude. As expected, capital formation has fostered poverty 
reduction, education expansion, gender equality, children’s health, reduction in the 
incidence of tuberculosis and water access. And last but not least, contraceptive use has 
been beneficial for poverty reduction, education expansion, gender equality, 
improvements in children and maternal health and water and sanitation access. The 
large amount of quality of life dimensions benefited by higher contraceptive prevalence 
rates and the relatively large impact that the latter have had on the former suggests that 
family planning programs might have been a quite cost-effective method to improve the 
general living conditions in many societies worldwide.  
[[[Table_4_around_here]]] 
Regional results 
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The findings we have reported so far refer to the world as a whole, so they document the 
existence of global associations, impacts and trends. Yet, given the huge heterogeneity 
existing across the world, it is convenient to estimate our models for its different regions 
as well – otherwise, our global findings might indeed mask offsetting or reinforcing 
trends occurring at lower levels of aggregation. For that purpose, we have chosen the 
following world partition: Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean and the group 
of Developed Countries. Our regional findings are summarized in tables 5 and 6 (which 
can be seen as regional replicas of tables 3 and 4 respectively). The detailed results of 
our models are too long to be presented here, so they can be found in appendix 4. Table 
5 summarizes the estimated values of the beta coefficients(𝛽?̂?); for the sake of brevity 
and simplicity, we will only report the findings involving our key explanatory variables: 
population and economic size and growth. Once again, a ‘+’ or a ‘–’ symbol appearing 
in Table 5 means that all statistically significant betas corresponding to the different 
model specifications have a positive or negative signs respectively. Whenever the signs 
of the betas disagree across model specifications, a ‘?’ sign appears in Table 5. As in 
Table 3, the ‘core’ and ‘spc.’ columns shown in Table 5 refer to the model results 
associated to overall population or the indicator-specific demographic variables. 
[[[Table_5_around_here]]] 
How can one make sense of the large amount of information summarized in Table 5? 
Given the heterogeneity across and within regions and the large amount of quality-of-
life indicators we are incorporating into the analysis, the results are once again quite 
difficult to interpret. And yet, a few broad regularities seem to emerge when closely 
inspecting the findings shown in Table 5.  
1. Among the four regions considered here, Africa is the one where our model 
specifications tend to be more conclusive (i.e. all models agree on the sign of the 
coefficient, thus showing a ‘+’ or ‘–’ sign in the table) and the group of Developed 
Countries is the region where they are less conclusive (more often than not, a ‘?’ sign 
indicating inconsistent results across model specifications shows up in the table). Latin 
America and the Caribbean and Asia stand somewhere in between these two extremes. 
A plausible explanation for the generalized lack of conclusive results for the group of 
rich countries can be the irrelevance of many of the MDG indicators to identify socio-
economic gradients in those countries. In many cases, most developed countries where 
very close to attain the corresponding MDG targets back in 1990 – thus having very 
small room for further welfare improvements. On the other hand, the MDG indicators 
can easily identify the large socio-economic gradients existing in Africa – the world 
region concentrating the largest amount of low-income countries. 
2. For all world regions considered here without exception, the effects of population and 
economic size are much stronger and consistent than the effects of population and 
economic growth. For the latter, it is quite uncommon that all our model specifications 
agree on the sign of the population or economic growth effects. Somewhat 
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paradoxically, we observe strong cross-section effects and quite weak and inconclusive 
cross-time effects – something which was observed as well for the world as a whole. 
3. When we substitute overall population by some other indicator-specific demographic 
variable (e.g. school-age population), our ‘spc.’ models tend to be sharper and more 
conclusive for all world regions considered here. Again, this supports the idea that since 
the effects of overall population can be quite varied and offsetting, it might be more 
meaningful to focus on a specific population subgroup that is more directly linked to the 
problem we are dealing with.  
In Table 6, we summarize the impacts of our four key explanatory variables on the 
different MDG indicators (i.e. the 𝛽?̂?Δ𝑋𝑘̅̅ ̅) at regional level. For the sake of brevity we 
only report the maximal and minimal statistically significant impacts that each Xk has on 
the different Ij. Once again, the large variety of indicators and regions considered in this 
study does not facilitate the possibility of reaching clear cut and universal conclusions. 
While we encourage readers to examine the complete results in detail (see appendix 4), 
here we briefly summarize some of the most outstanding patterns. 
1. Generally speaking, the impact of population size tends to go in the normatively 
desirable direction for virtually all MDG indicators for the cases of Africa and Latin 
America and the Caribbean (i.e. reducing poverty and maternal and child mortality, 
increasing education and gender parity, and so on). However, such effect is quite 
unclear for the group of Developed countries and Asia. On the other hand, the impact of 
population growth is extremely irregular and unclear in direction (oscillating between 
positive and negative values) across MDG indicators and world regions. As regards the 
impacts of countries’ economic size, they generally tend to be positive in all regions 
except for Latin America and the Caribbean. Lastly, the impacts of economic growth 
are surprisingly erratic and uneven across regions and MDG indicators, very often 
reaching opposing conclusions depending on the models we are dealing with. Summing 
up, we typically find that the impact of demographic and economic size tends to be 
more coherent (i.e. all impacts going in the same direction across model specifications) 
than the corresponding impact of growth. 
2. The impact of economic size is not only more coherent (i.e. going in the same 
direction) than the corresponding impact of economic growth, but also tends to be larger 
in absolute value across all world regions and MDG indicators. On the other hand, the 
impact’s magnitude for population size only tend to be bigger than the impact of 
population growth for the case of Africa – for the remaining regions there are no clear 
patterns, with both population size and growth effects being somehow similar in 
magnitude across MDG indicators. 
3. In general, when comparing the impacts one obtains when shifting from models 
including overall population to models with indicator-specific demographic variables, 
the latter tend to be more coherent and larger in magnitude across regions and MDG 
indicators – but there are quite a number of exceptions as well (see appendix 4). Once 
again, these results reinforce the idea that overall population growth can occur through a 
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variety of channels with many different and potentially offsetting effects, which in turn 
are highly dependent on the MDG indicator we are dealing with. 
[[[Table_6_around_here]]] 
Summary and concluding remarks 
For a long time there has been a contentious debate on the implications of demographic 
and economic growth for societies’ and individuals’ well-being. This is the first 
comprehensive study aimed at estimating the macro level effects of population and 
economic growth on the different quality of life domains belonging to the UN’s MDG 
framework. Having recently reached the MDG target year of 2015 it is a good moment 
to take stock and investigate whether these two key factors have either benefited or 
hindered countries’ development processes – an issue that can have implications for the 
formulation of informed policies in the post-2015 development agenda (for instance 
within the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals framework). 
Our empirical findings suggest that larger countries have typically been more successful 
than smaller ones in achieving the different MDGs. The impact of overall population 
growth is, however, quite unclear: depending on the model specification we are dealing 
with we either obtain positive or negative effects that very often are not statistically 
significant. Yet, when we substitute overall population growth by other demographic 
variables that are more directly related to the problem at hand (e.g. focus on the school 
aged population when studying the evolution of school enrolment rates) our findings are 
sharper and usually suggest a negative relationship between population growth and 
quality of life improvement. It is likely that specifications focusing on overall 
population only hide relevant but offsetting impacts, something that muddies the waters 
and generates overly parsimonious models – an issue that is line with the findings 
reported by Kelley and Schmidt (2005) in their study on the impact of population 
growth on economic growth. The results shown in this paper suggest that even if 
population growth has ceased to arise the worries it used to back in the 60s and 70s 
(when it was commonly referred to as ‘the population problem’), it continues to pose 
formidable challenges that cannot be ignored to those fast growing countries that aim to 
improve the quality of life of their inhabitants. 
As regards the impact of economic forces, our findings indicate that the size of the 
economy (as measured with the GDP per capita) has usually – though not systematically 
– benefited countries’ achievement of the MDGs. However, the relationship between 
economic growth and quality of life improvement is very unclear: more often than not, 
the impact of economic growth has either been inconclusive or even negative. The fact 
that economic growth does not have a clear positive impact on most MDG-indicators – 
indeed, it does have a clear negative relationship with the key indicator of poverty in 
most model specifications – is truly remarkable. While surprising at first sight, such 
conclusion coheres with other similar findings reported in Easterly (1999) covering the 
earlier 1960-1990 period and, more recently, in Harttgen et al (2013) and Vollmer et al 
(2014), where the authors find a very small to null association between economic 
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growth and improvements in several quality of life indicators. Given the blind reliance 
of many international institutions on economic growth as the main pathway to ensure 
countries’ development, the results reported here might have far-reaching implications 
warranting discussion upon which it will be necessary to reflect. 
One factor that might partially explain the lack of association between economic growth 
and quality of life improvement is the mounting inequality that has recently been 
observed in many countries around the world. Increases in private incomes might not 
necessarily translate into increased public goods as the ones represented by the different 
MDG indicators: in the absence of redistributive or pro-poor policies, economic growth 
might not contribute to raise countries’ overall living standards. As the experience in 
places like Sri Lanka, Kerala (India), Costa Rica, China or Cuba has shown, progress in 
several quality of life indicators can be achieved in low-income settings through 
investments in public services (see Drèze and Sen 1989 or Anand and Ravallion 1993 
among others). The exploratory tests we have performed in which both the Gini index 
and the economic growth variables have positive coefficients when modeling the 
evolution of poverty levels (suggesting that unequal growth is deleterious for the 
reduction of poverty – results not reported here but available upon request) give support 
to a hypothesis that, if confirmed, would cast doubts on the efficiency of the so-called 
trickle-down effects of a growth-enhancing strategy to better countries’ living 
conditions – but which, on the other hand, would require an entire paper on its own to 
be thoroughly tested and investigated.  
In the light of the results shown in this paper, it remains to be seen how the different 
dimensions of human development can be advanced simultaneously for those countries 
with lower development levels. In this respect, further research is needed to explore the 
existence (or lack thereof) of underlying factors that might help to understand the 
mechanisms promoting joint improvement in the different MDGs. Our findings have 
identified three factors that can be helpful in that respect: capital formation, 
contraceptive prevalence and gender equality. This suggests that investments in 
countries’ fixed assets (such as hospitals, schools, roads, railways and the like), in 
family planning and in gender equality programs can have synergistic and cumulative 
effects on the simultaneous improvement of most MDG-indicators considered in this 
study. 
Endnotes 
Endnote #1: The idea that population growth might be detrimental for countries’ socio-
economic development has gained traction over the years, so the classical population 
debate has cooled down and been replaced by other “demodystopias” (Domingo 2008), 
like population ageing, South-North migration or refugee crises. While there are several 
reasons that might explain the focus shift towards other population related problems, the 
observation that “the world has survived the population bomb” (Lam 2011,  i.e. contrary 
to what the pessimists in the 60s had foreseen, the world has not (yet) experienced mass 
starvation or depletion of nonrenewable resources) is among the most important ones. 
18 
 
Another one might the high human costs entailed by certain neo-Malthusian policies 
like China’s one-child policies or the massive sterilization campaigns that took place in 
giants like India or Brazil, which has led to a gradual abandonment of the “population 
problem” rhetoric in favor of the sexual and reproductive rights paradigm settled in the 
1994 Cairo International Population Conference. 
Endnote #6: Hausman tests have been run to choose between ‘random’ or ‘fixed’ effects 
models, resulting in favor of the latter (Hausman 1978). 
Endnote #8: As will be seen in the empirical results section, such indicator-specific 
variables include fertility rates (‘fert’), infant population (i.e. below five) size 
(‘logchpop’) and primary school aged (i.e. those between 5 and 14) population size and 
growth (‘logypop’, ‘ypopgr1’, ‘ypopgr5’, ‘ypopgr10’). 
Endnote#10: Such an increase in economic and population size is by no means novel, it 
dates back almost two centuries from now (see Easterlin 2000, Firebaugh 2003). The 
only reason for choosing the year 1990 is that it corresponds to the start of the MDGs 
time frame analyzed here. 
Endnote #12: For I6, I7 and I8 we have not found a clear indicator-specific demographic 
variable that can substitute overall population growth. In that case, we are only 
considering 2·3=6 different models. 
Endnote #13: The statistically significant positive beta coefficients associated to fertility 
rates when modeling the behavior of I1 (see appendix 2) suggest that higher fertility is 
associated with increasing poverty levels, a finding in line with the results reported by 
Eastwood and Lipton (1999). 
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  I1 (MDG1) I2 (MDG2) I3 (MDG3) I4 (MDG4) 
Region 1990 2012 Goal 2015 1990 2012 Goal 2015 1990 2012 Goal 2015 1990 2014 Goal 2015 
OC 34.8 32.5 17.4 73.7 87 100 0.9 0.94 1 82.3 53 27.4 
NA 4.6 2.9 2.3 81.4 96.3 100 0.82 0.97 1 77.3 23.6 25.8 
EA 56 6.8 28 93.3 87.3 100 0.95 1 1 42.4 12.7 14.1 
SA 51 25 25.5 76.6 90.3 100 0.77 0.96 1 114.9 53.5 38.3 
SEA 42.8 11.9 21.4 90.8 91.2 100 0.96 1 1 61.9 28.1 20.6 
WA 3 2.5 1.5 83.2 90.8 100 0.87 0.96 1 67.3 23 22.4 
CCA 18.7 5.5 9.4 89.3 89.3 100 0.99 0.99 1 77.2 33.7 25.7 
LAC 11.3 4.8 5.7 88.4 92.9 100 0.98 1.01 1 52.6 16.7 17.5 
DC 0.7 0.8 0.4 96.5 95.6 100 1 1 1 13.8 5.9 4.6 
SSA 59.2 48.8 29.6 56.6 72.5 100 0.85 0.92 1 180.4 89.2 60.1 
WORLD 35.4 15.9 17.7 85.4 88.9 100 0.91 0.98 1 70.3 34.3 23.4 
  I5 (MDG5) I6 (MDG6) I7 (MDG7 - Water) I8 (MDG7 - Sanitation) 
Region 1990 2013 Goal 2015 1990 2013 Goal 2015 1990 2012 GOAL 2015 1990 2012 GOAL 2015 
OC 382.8 189.6 95.7 242.4 264.81 <242.3 52 55.6 76 34.8 35.1 67.4 
NA 162.8 68.5 40.7 64.23 49.7 <64.22 86.8 90.9 93.4 72.4 91.4 86.2 
EA 94 32.9 23.5 156.53 77.25 <156.5 68 92.2 84 26.9 66.7 63.4 
SA 524.2 180.4 131.1 211.62 178.57 <211.6 71.8 91.4 85.9 23.1 42.1 61.6 
SEA 311.1 131.9 77.8 259.34 203.84 <259.3 70.8 89.1 85.4 47.9 70.7 73.9 
WA 102.9 57.9 25.7 53.17 24.25 <53.17 84.7 90.7 92.4 68.8 88.7 84.4 
CCA 70.8 37.9 17.7 121.33 99.05 <121.3 84.6 86.2 92.3 87 95.5 93.5 
LAC 131.4 79.3 32.8 84.45 44.1 <84.45 85.2 94 92.6 67.4 82.2 83.7 
DC 25.5 15.2 6.4 30.4 23.96 <30.40 97.9 99.1 98.9 94.9 95.3 97.4 
SSA 965.2 488.5 241.3 279.1 285.78 <279.0 47.6 64.2 73.8 23.9 29.6 62 
WORLD 284.1 140.9 71 150.76 124.65 <150.7 76.1 89.4 88.1 48.5 64.4 74.3 
Table 1. Achievement of the 10 world regions in the 8 variables corresponding to the different MDGs (Oceania (OC), North Africa (NA), East Asia (EA), South Asia (SA), 
South East Asia (SEA), West Asia (WA), Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Developed Countries (DC), Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA)). Green cells indicate that the corresponding goal has been achieved. Orange cells indicate that the corresponding indicator has improved but the target has not been 
achieved. Red cells indicate that the corresponding indicator has deteriorated over time. Source: Author calculations using international data sources. 
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Population (in millions) GDP per capita (in PPP) 
Year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Oceania 6.43 7.21 8.06 8.93 9.84 1705 2139 2422 2759 3984 
Northern Africa 119.67 131.02 141.31 151.49 163.37 2413 2728 3477 4855 6183 
Eastern Asia 1206.50 1280.56 1341.99 1385.48 1421.89 1253 2195 3091 5129 9039 
Southern Asia 1191.34 1319.90 1448.11 1569.15 1681.30 1158 1457 1814 2618 3923 
South-eastern Asia 440.87 481.08 521.26 559.04 594.97 1945 2862 3128 4108 5603 
Western Asia 126.46 143.66 160.36 181.50 206.09 5274 5634 7360 10655 15102 
Caucasus and Central Asia 65.72 68.78 70.66 73.80 79.47 1427 2058 2575 4348 7503 
Latin America & C. 444.16 485.21 525.27 561.47 594.99 4769 5715 6683 8208 10713 
Developed Countries 1147.67 1175.11 1196.10 1216.80 1241.09 17053 18636 23056 28915 33532 
Sub-Saharan Africa 507.83 582.09 664.97 758.05 865.55 915 948 1121 1497 1932 
WORLD 5256.64 5674.62 6078.09 6465.71 6858.57 5042 5797 6979 8945 11318 
Table 2. Regional evolution of population size and GDP per capita from 1990 to 2010. Source: United Nations Population Division and Penn World 
Tables 8.1. 
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MDG 1 
(core) 
MDG 1 
(spc.) 
MDG 2 
(core) 
MDG 2 
(spc.) 
MDG 3 
(core) 
MDG 3 
(spc.) 
MDG 4 
(core) 
MDG 4 
(spc.) 
MDG 5 
(core) 
MDG 5 
(spc.) 
MDG 6 
MDG 7 
(water) 
MDG 7 
(sanit.) 
Indicator 
scale 
(-) (-) (+) (+) (+) (+) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (+) (+) 
loggdp - - ? + ? ? + ? - - - ? + 
gdpgr1 + + ? - ? - ? ? - ? + ? ? 
gdpgr5 ? + ? - - - ? ? ? ? + ? ? 
gdpgr10 + + ? - ? - - ? - - ? - - 
popsize - - + + + + - - - - ? + ? 
1-yr popg ? + ? ? ? - ? + ? + ? ? ? 
5-yr popg ? + ? ? ? - - + ? + ? ? ? 
10-y popg ? + ? - ? - - + ? + ? ? - 
urb - ? ? ? ? ? - - - - ? + + 
pden - - + + + + + + + + ? - ? 
cpr - - + + + + - - - - + + + 
demo ? ? - - - - - - - - + + - 
capf - - + + + + - - + ? - + ? 
Table 3. Summary of the signs of the beta coefficients for economic and population size and growth across models for the 8 MDG indicators. ‘+’ (resp. 
‘–’) signs appears when all statistically significant betas corresponding to the different models have a positive (resp. negative) sign. ‘?’ indicates different 
beta signs across alternative model specifications. Green (resp. red) colored cells indicate whether the sign of the estimated betas goes in the normatively 
desirable (resp. undesirable) direction. Source: Author calculations. 
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  I1 (Poverty) I2 (Education) I3 (Gender) I4 (IMR) I5 (MMR) I6 (TB) I7 (Water) I8 (Sanitation) 
Core variables   
       
loggdp [-19,-14.51] [-4.9,3.92] [-0.09,-0.09] [7.09,28.45] [-130.42,-48.1] [-113,-40.75] [-2.24,-0.56] [1.55,7.44] 
gdpgr-1,5,10 [-4.16,-0.06] [-,-] [-0.001,0.005] [-1.9,0.07] [-6.45,-0.9] [1.49,28.2] [-0.26,-0.04] [-0.41,0.76] 
logpop [-6.66,-4.19] [11.58,16.06] [0.15,0.18] [-35.96,-26.95] [-96.7,-49.3] [-24.65,-24.65] [1.71,2.92] [-2.49,2.03] 
popgr-1,5,10 [-0.41,2.26] [-8.16,2.64] [-0.03,0.01] [-6.39,25.94] [19.65,19.65] [1.93,5.81] [-1.46,0.33] [-2.99,1.79] 
Indicator-specific variables                  
loggdp [-19,-15.64] [5.92,9.09] [-0.11,0.22] [-13.42,17.89] [-139.12,-52.86] 
   gdpgr-1,5,10 [-3.59,-0.08] [-0.01,0.45] [-0.002,0.006] [-1.77,0.01] [-4.61,-0.95] 
   logpop [-6.27,-3.05] 
       fert [-3.95,-1.74] 
  
[-18.58,-9.88] [-34.71,-16.81] 
   logchpop 
   
[-12.62,-10.45] [-3.3,-2.74] 
   logypop 
 
[5.8,8.42] [0.051,0.109] 
     yppgr-1,5,10 
 
[-1.09,3.62] [0.011,0.104] 
     Control variables                 
pden [-5.97,-2.39] [1.44,8.16] [0.05,0.1] [0.59,2.82] [2.5,7.38] [-,-] [-0.31,-0.22] [-0.22,-0.22] 
cpr [-4.66,-1.56] [1.17,9.82] [0.01,0.06] [-38.66,-11.84] [-26.14,-10.44] [7.95,12.91] [1.27,1.98] [1.06,3.12] 
Urb [-1.8,-1.48] [-1.5,2.21] [-0.05,0.03] [-9.44,-3.67] [-26.55,-11.57] [-,-] [0.99,1.76] [1.5,3.69] 
Demo [-,-] [-0.57,-0.23] [-0.01,-0.01] [-2.95,-0.9] [-4.91,-1.82] [1.51,2.3] [0.13,0.21] [-0.13,-0.07] 
Capf [-0.86,-0.25] [0.8,1.17] [0.002,0.007] [-3.2,-0.97] [1.06,1.16] [-11.36,-5.73] [0.05,0.09] [-0.21,0.15] 
Table 4. Impact of different explanatory variables on the changes in the indicators of poverty (I1), net enrolment ratio (I2), gender parity index on the net 
enrolment ratio (I3), under-five mortality rate (I4), maternal mortality rate (I5), incidence of tuberculosis (I6), percentage of population with access to 
improved water source (I7), percentage of population with access to improved sanitation facilities (I8). Note: We have only considered the impacts 
corresponding to 10% statistically significant betas. Source: Author calculations. 
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WORLD Africa Asia DC LAC 
MDG Key var. Core Spc. Core Spc. Core Spc. Core Spc. Core Spc. 
I1 
popsize - - - - ? ? ? ? ? ? 
popgr ? + ? ? ? ? ? ? ? + 
econsize - - - - - - ? ? ? ? 
econgr + + + + + + ? ? ? ? 
I2 
popsize + + + + ? + ? ? + + 
popgr ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? - 
econsize ? + + + ? + ? ? ? ? 
econgr ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
I3 
popsize + + + + + + ? ? + ? 
popgr ? - ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
econsize ? + ? + - ? ? ? - - 
econgr ? - ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
I4 
popsize - - - - ? - ? ? - - 
popgr - + ? + ? ? ? + ? + 
econsize + ? - - ? ? - - + + 
econgr ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
I5 
popsize - - - - ? ? + ? - - 
popgr ? + ? ? ? ? ? ? ? + 
econsize - - - - - - - - ? ? 
econgr - - ? ? ? ? ? - ? ? 
I6 
popsize ? NA - NA + NA + NA ? NA 
popgr ? NA ? NA ? NA ? NA + NA 
econsize - NA ? NA ? NA - NA ? NA 
econgr ? NA ? NA ? NA ? NA ? NA 
I7 
popsize + NA + NA ? NA ? NA + NA 
popgr ? NA ? NA ? NA ? NA ? NA 
econsize ? NA - NA + NA ? NA ? NA 
econgr ? NA ? NA - NA ? NA ? NA 
I8 
popsize ? NA - NA ? NA ? NA + NA 
popgr ? NA ? NA ? NA ? NA ? NA 
econsize ? NA ? NA + NA ? NA ? NA 
econgr - NA ? NA ? NA ? NA ? NA 
Table 5. Summary of the signs of the beta coefficients for economic and population size and growth across models for the 8 MDG indicators 
across world regions. Source: Author calculations. 
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  I1 (Poverty) I2 (Education) I3 (Gender) I4 (IMR) I5 (MMR) I6 (TB) I7 (Water) I8 (Sanitation) 
Africa Core variables   
       
Pop_size [-23.85, -18.03] [14.69, 31.04] [0.13, 0.29] [-86.53, -38.79] [-251.74, -71.93] [-244.55, -129.47] [4.86, 9.68] [-3.97, -1.22] 
Pop_growth [-0.74, 2.9] [-0.23, -0.07] [-0.001, 0.001] [-1.17, 0.75] [4.88, 29.26] [1.92, 1.92] [-1.26, 0.42] [-0.27, 0.32] 
Econ_size [-27.67, -3.56] [-11.1, 26.52] [0.02, 0.64] [-69.64, 23.69] [-127.6, -59.87] [-182.28, -109.37] [-2.88, -1.74] [0.55, 5.23] 
Econ_growth [-7.21, 0.77] [0.004, 3.05] [0.0001, 0.003] [-14.94, -0.1] [-38.95, 11.9] [37.07, 103.86] [-0.38, -0.38] [-2.95, 0.76] 
Indicator-specific variables                
Pop_size [-23.11, -18.96] [11.16, 28.23] [0.05, 0.13] [-71.29, -42.51] [-120.63, -84.70] 
   
Pop_growth [8.67, 27.96] [-4.06, -0.86] [-0.05, 0.009] [-17.01, -11.51] [-69.08, 60.77] 
   
Econ_size [-30.03, -4.11] [4.95, 36.73] [0.03, 0.56] [-97.51, -18.21] [-133.67, -72.91] 
   
Econ_growth [-9.5, 0.9] [0.003, 1.51] [0.0001, 0.007] [-13.76, -0.14] [-30.83, 12.18] 
   
Asia Core variables          
 Pop_size [6.77, 10.95] [9.8, 16.01] [0.14, 0.30] [-19.6, 37.78] [18.31, 66.68] [35.43, 183.03] [-2.63, -1.29] [-3.02, -3.02] 
 Pop_growth [-7.69, -7.69] [-2.32, 1.44] [-0.07, 0.02] [-0.89, 26.16] [16.05, 16.05] [-9.63, 66.78] [0.15, 0.71] [-0.85, 5.88] 
 Econ_size [-30.86, -24.54] [5.08, 9.23] [-0.25, -0.09] [34.33, 71.11] [-171.97, -23.37] [-104.8, -25.76] [4.95, 16.07] [6.86, 21.3] 
 Econ_growth [-3.79, -0.24] [-0.5, -0.03] [0.009, 0.009] [-0.98, -0.68] [-10.8, 2.96] [-2.45, 7.6] [-1.07, 0.08] [-0.55, 0.04] 
 Indicator-specific variables                
 Pop_size [6.54, 13.72] [2.99, 8.87] [0.08, 0.19] [-9.91, -5.65] [1.67, 1.67]    
 Pop_growth [-18.67, -18.67] [-6.72, 2.74] [-0.08, 0.08] [-11.08, 21.68] [11.66, 73.80]    
 Econ_size [-41.68, -25] [7.96, 15.65] [0.09, 0.09] [18.62, 48.89] [-75.78, -18.85]    
 Econ_growth [-14.42, -0.23] [-0.67, -0.05] [-0.005, 0.009] [-0.7, -0.55] [-0.52, 2.68]    
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Developed 
regions 
Core variables          
Pop_size [-0.74, 0.99] [-, -] [-, -] [-, -] [1.88, 3.56] [1.82, 7.23] [-0.17, -0.12] [-0.10, -0.10] 
 Pop_growth [0.15, 0.15] [-2.93, -0.19] [-0.003, -0.002] [0.78, 2.13] [-0.79, -0.79] [-0.42, 0.72] [-0.04, 0.16] [-0.14, 0.10] 
 Econ_size [-3.37, -1.34] [-11.85, -11.85] [0.01, 0.02] [-19.36, -15.79] [-19.38, -4.61] [-14.76, -4.37] [0.33, 1.00] [-, -] 
 Econ_growth [-2.26, 0.54] [0.22, 2.60] [-, -] [-1.46, -0.27] [-0.33, 0.1] [-0.16, 1.61] [-0.16, -0.06] [-0.03, 0.02] 
 Indicator-specific variables                
Pop_size [-0.68, 0.79] [0.71, 2.24] [-, -] [0.7, 1.04] [-, -] 
   
Pop_growth [0.20, 0.20] [-2.13, -0.72] [0.002, 0.002] [-3.24, -2.08] [-0.61, 0.35] 
   
Econ_size [-1.41, -0.63] [-, -] [0.01, 0.02] [-25.17, -12.31] [-20.80, -3.06] 
   
Econ_growth [-1.22, 0.55] [-2.42, -0.37] [-, -] [-0.38, 3.00] [-2.91, 0.26] 
   
Latin 
America 
and the 
Caribbean 
Core variables          
Pop_size [-4.83, -3.55] [5.15, 8.63] [0.06, 0.1] [-22.37, -10.57] [-9.44, -4.11] [-6.49, -6.49] [0.31, 0.73] [0.97, 2.56] 
Pop_growth [-11.75, -8.25] [1.56, 5.63] [-0.14, -0.006] [3.91, 3.91] [45.3, 45.3] [-42.75, -7.52] [-2.08, -1.72] [0.71, 12.53] 
Econ_size [5.81, 5.81] [-, -] [-0.11, -0.04] [21.95, 78.41] [-65.12, 85.27] [-37.97, -10.44] [1.86, 1.86] [-3.52, 0.89] 
 Econ_growth [0.49, 1.08] [1.95, 2.36] [-0.004, -0.003] [-10.36, 3.24] [-33.39, 25.02] [-10.6, 14.56] [-1, 0.19] [-0.56, -0.18] 
 Indicator-specific variables        
 Pop_size [-, -] [2.99, 9.63] [0.02, 0.04] [-2.66, -1.7] [4.13, 5.16]    
 Pop_growth [-26.55, -10.71] [1.34, 8.51] [-, -] [-26.3, -21.73] [-87.15, -46.75]    
 Econ_size [-3.05, 5.19] [7.04, 7.04] [-0.07, -0.04] [13.65, 66.35] [-41.94, -12.51]    
 Econ_growth [1.83, 1.83] [-3.73, 0.42] [-0.02, -0.003] [-7.47, 3.24] [4.16, 4.16]    
 
Table 6. Regional impact of population and economic size and growth on the changes in the indicators of poverty (I1), net enrolment ratio (I2), gender 
parity index on the net enrolment ratio (I3), under-five mortality rate (I4), maternal mortality rate (I5), incidence of tuberculosis (I6), percentage of 
population with access to improved water source (I7), percentage of population with access to improved sanitation facilities (I8). Note: We have only 
considered the impacts corresponding to 10% statistically significant betas. Source: Author calculations. 
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